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WHY APPELLATE COURTS HAVE REJECTED THE
ARGUMENT THAT THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
TRUMPS THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
BARBARA J. COx*
INTRODUCTION

Lisa Miller has "disappeared" with her daughter, IMJ, and a
Vermont family court judge has found her in contempt and ordered
her arrest.' This is the latest stage in the ongoing struggle between
Lisa and her lesbian ex-partner, Janet Jenkins, which began in
November of 2003 over custody of their daughter, IMJ. IMJ was born
while Lisa and Janet were partners in an intact Vermont civil union.
Lisa's "kidnapping" of their daughter and refusal to relinquish custody
to Janet on January 1, 2010, as ordered by the Vermont court in
November 2009, has thrust this dispute into the spotlight once again.2
* Clara Shortridge Foltz Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
I would like to thank California Western School of Law; Dean Steven Smith and
Associate Dean William Aceves; Brigham Young University, Clark School of Law,
and Professor Lynn Wardle for supporting the Symposium where this paper was
presented. I would also like to thank the Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law,
where I presented an earlier version of this work. I owe a debt of gratitude to Kellie
Delaney and Sarah Garrick for the help they provided me with this Article. Thanks
also to the editors of the International Law Journal for publishing the Symposium
papers and for their efforts in editing this Article, and to my spouse, Peg Habetler,
for twenty years of support as we both seek marriage equality for same-sex couples
and our families.
1. Brent Curtis, Arrest Warrant Issued for Virginia Mom, RUTLAND HERALD
http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
2010,
24,
Feb.
(Vt.),
AID=/20100224/NEWSO4/2240355/1002/NEWS01&Template-printart.
2. See Press Release, Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Mother Seeks
Public
Help
to
Locate
Missing
Child
(Jan.
4,
2010),
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/press-releases/press-release-miller-jenkins-011O.pdf. The Vermont trial court judge ruled in November 2009 that Lisa must
relinquish custody of their daughter, IMJ, to Janet after Lisa's continuing refusals to
allow visitation between Janet and their daughter. In all of 2008 and 2009, Lisa only
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Regardless of one's opinion as to whether Lisa or Janet should
have custody, it seems unlikely that many people believe a mother
should kidnap her child to avoid sharing custody with the child's other
parent, especially when such kidnapping violates a direct order of the
court handling the custody dispute.3 Our national policy since 1980,
when Congress adopted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA),4 has been to prevent exactly this type of situation in disputes
over child custody or visitation.' In that legislation, Congress found
that pre-PKPA law contributed to the tendency of parties in custody
disputes to "frequently resort to the seizure, restraint, concealment,
and interstate transportation of children, the disregard of court orders,
excessive relitigation of cases, [and] obtaining of conflicting orders by
the courts of various jurisdictions . . . ."6

permitted about 24 hours of parent-child contact between Janet and IMJ in each
year. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, at 4-5, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No.
2009-473 (Vt., Jan. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 1502577. Lisa's lawyers, after trying to
resign as her attorney in January, returned to the Vermont Supreme Court in March
2010, appealing the trial court's order based on their assertion that Janet is not IMJ's
parent. In this third appeal to that court, Janet's lawyers have argued that "the law
of the case" doctrine should prevent Lisa from continuing to raise this argument, id.
at 6-12, especially since the Vermont Supreme Court previously expressly ruled that
Janet is considered to be IMJ's parent based on Vermont law. Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 970 (Vt. 2006). Both sides' briefs are available at
www.glad.org/work/cases/miller-jenkins-v-miller-jenkins.
3. Of course, Lisa disputes Janet's right to be recognized as a parent. See
Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 2, at 11-12. However, Lisa and Janet
agreed together to have a child, Janet was involved as a parent of IMJ throughout
their time together as a family, and Lisa herself indicated on the dissolution form
that Janet was entitled to "parent-child" visitation. See infra Part II.A.
4. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat.
3566 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 92 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter PKPA].
5. Unless specifically noted, custody disputes and visitation disputes are
"Visitation determinations" were
treated the same throughout this Article.
specifically included in amendments to the PKPA by Act of Nov. 12, 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-374, 112 Stat. 3383 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(9) (2006)). They are
defined as "a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the visitation
of a child and includes permanent and temporary orders and modifications." 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(9) (2006).
6. PKPA, supra note 4, § 7(a)(3). Congress also stated that the purposes of the
PKPA were to: "discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody in
the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family
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But now some attorneys and commentators have argued that the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 7 which purports to permit a court
in one state to refuse to recognize the judgment of a court in another
state if the judgment involves the marriages (and perhaps other legal
relationships) of same-sex couples,8 trumps the protections of the
PKPA as applied to parents in same-sex relationships.9 Arguments
like this, so far unsuccessful in appellate courts, convince people like
Lisa Miller to ignore the valid orders of the Vermont Family Court
and refuse to share custody of their daughter. Lisa now finds herself
in contempt of court and subject to arrest because she believes that she
has the right to prevent Janet from seeing their daughter. The lawyers
who argued her case seemingly convinced her that DOMA permitted
her to disregard the Vermont court's decision.
Some brief background is first needed. Under Article IV of the
U.S. Constitution, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
state. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."'o Congress adopted the Full Faith and Credit Act in
the First Congress; it now provides that the acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of any state "shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
relationships for the child"; "avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between
State courts in matters of child custody and visitation which have in the past resulted
in the shifting of children from State to State with harmful effects on their wellbeing;" and "deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of children
undertaken to obtain custody and visitation awards." Id. § 7(c)(4)-(6). All of these
issues arise in the Miller-Jenkins litigation.
7. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)) [hereinafter
DOMA].
8. Id. § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
9. See id. § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) ("No State, territory, possession of the
United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe,
respecting a relationship between person of the same-sex that is treated as a
marriage under the law of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right
or claim arising from such relationship.").
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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State ... from which they are taken."' 1 Both the PKPA and DOMA
were adopted under the power given to Congress in the "Effects
Clause" of the Constitution.12
The United States Supreme Court has held that states owe
"exacting" full faith and credit obligations to judicial proceedings of
other states, and that there is no "roving public policy exception" that
can be used to preclude recognition of valid, final judgments.1 3
Attempts to use a public policy exception to prevent "migratory
divorce . . . ground to a halt, in fact, through the Supreme Court's

insistence on these 'exacting' obligations."' 4 As Professor Emily Sack
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."); PKPA, supra note 4, § 7(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C note (2006) ("For
those reasons it is necessary to . . . establish national standards under which the
courts of such jurisdictions will determine . . . the effect to be given by each such

jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of other such jurisdictions."); DOMA,
supra note 7, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (discussing the effect to be given to
judgments and public acts of other states that concern "a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State ... or a right or claim arising from such relationship").
13. Thomas ex rel. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). In
conflicts cases concerning the statutes of different states, the Supreme Court permits
state courts to use a public policy exception to refuse to follow another state's law if
doing so would violate the forum state's fundamental public policy. Id. Although
commentators argue that the public policy exception is unconstitutional in certain
situations, see, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
UnconstitutionalPublic Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997), the Supreme
Court has consistently allowed it to be used in statutory cases while rejecting its use
in judgment cases. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAW §
117 (1971) (which states "[a] valid judgment rendered in one state . . . will be
recognized and enforced in a sister state even though the strong public policy of the
latter state would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim");
Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition ofAdoptions
by Gays andLesbians, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (2008) (same).
14. Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of
Non-Uniform MarriageLaws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 452-53 (2005) (citing Williams
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (holding that North Carolina must recognize
the Nevada divorce of two North Carolina residents)). For a further discussion of
the Williams cases in the context of interstate recognition of adoptions by same-sex
couples, see Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be
Recognized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite AntiMarriageStatutes that DiscriminateAgainst Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REV.
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notes, "use of a public policy exception to refuse recognition to outof-state judgments is not permitted."
But Lisa's lawyers and others argue that DOMA, on its face,
requires the opposite result because it allows a state to refuse to give
effect to judicial proceedings concerning same-sex relationships
treated as a marriage' 6 in another state or rights and claims arising
from those relationships.' 7 Thus, if DOMA is interpreted to the full
751, 761-770 (2003) [hereinafter Cox, Adoptions].
15. Emily J. Sack, Civil Unions and the Meaning of the Public Policy
Exception at the Boundaries ofDomestic Relations Law, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 497,
500 (2005) (citing Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (requiring Mississippi to
give recognize a Missouri judgment based on a gambling contract made in
Mississippi where it was void)). As the Supreme Court noted in Baker, the 'Tull
Faith and Credit Clause 'ordered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in

the judgment of another State, because the practical operation of the federal system,
which the Constitution designed, demanded it."' Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 (citing
Fauntleroy,210 U.S. at 237).
16. DOMA, supra note 7, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). Of course,
whether a Vermont civil union would fall within DOMA's purview depends on
whether a civil union is considered to be "a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage." The Vermont civil union was created in
response to Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), but the Vermont legislature
"deliberately chose to create the status of civil union in order to avoid broadening
the concept of marriage to include same-sex couples." Sack, supra note 15, at 507.
She argued that the Federal DOMA and state DOMAs that refer only to marriages
"may not necessarily establish a public policy against recognizing same-sex civil
unions from other states." Id. at 507; see also Christopher D. Sawyer, Note, Practice
What You Preach: California's Obligation to Give Full Faith and Credit to the
Vermont Civil Union, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 727 (2003) (arguing that anti-marriage
statutes should be confined to marriages alone and exclude other legal relationships).
For a similar discussion concerning domestic partnerships, see Cox, Adoptions,
supra note 14, at 778. This Article analyzes whether Virginia must recognize the
parenting order from Vermont based on a civil union without discussing this
potentially limiting argument about DOMA's application outside of marriage. But
see Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683-84 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
DOMA challenge by couple in California domestic partnership because it was not a
marriage); Bishop v. Oklahoma, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1247-48 (N.D. Okla. 2006)
(couple lacked standing to challenge DOMA because civil union not treated as a
marriage under Vermont law).
17. See, e.g., David M. Wagner, A Vermont Civil Union and A Child in
Virginia: Full Faith and Credit?, 3 AvE MARIA L. REv. 657, 667-78 (2005); Rena
M. Lindevaldsen, Same-Sex Relationships and the Full Faith and Credit Clause:
Reducing America to the Lowest Common Denominator, 16 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 29 (2009) (arguing that DOMA should be interpreted as overriding
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breadth of its language, courts will be permitted to ignore judgments
that must otherwise be recognized under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Fortunately, no appellate court has read DOMA to require this
result. Such a reading of DOMA would take the country back to a
world before the PKPA, when parental kidnapping happened regularly
and parents spent years litigating child custody and visitation in
multiple courts." It would also change the Supreme Court's current
rule of judgment recognition to allow for consideration of a "roving
public policy exception," as is now used to allow states to refuse
recognition to other states' statutes, so long as the forum state has
sufficient contacts with the litigation to assert its own interests in the
case. 19
This Article seeks to explain why courts should not be permitted
to interpret DOMA to displace judgment recognition based on a forum
state's public policy against legal relationships for same-sex couples.
If courts interpret DOMA in this manner, nothing would prevent
Congress from exempting other types of judgments from the
protection of the Full Faith and Credit clause, thereby permitting
relitigation of judgments that are now considered final and binding in
every state. Clearly, same-sex couples would not be the only group
affected by such a drastic change in current Full Faith and Credit
jurisprudence. 20
Section II of this Article discusses two recent cases that included
arguments that, under DOMA, a court in one state should refuse to
recognize another state's judgment in the context of a custody or
PKPA). Professor Lindevaldsen served as Lisa Miller's attorney in part of this
litigation. See supra note 2.
18. It is particularly troubling that such a significant change in Supreme Court
jurisprudence would be considered in cases where biological mothers are trying to
prevent their lesbian ex-partners from having custody or visitation with the children
that both women decided to have and raise together.
19. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
20. For example, Professor Courtney G. Joslin's article, discusses the same
cases that this Article does, and outlines the potential problems that could arise if
prior determinations of parental status are not afforded interstate recognition in the
areas of paternity and surrogacy, both areas that are highly contested between the
states. Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of
Disharmony: Same-Sex ParentFamilies and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L J. 563, 600-16
(2009).
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Although these arguments

were successful in Virginia and Alabama trial courts, both states'
appellate courts have thus far held that DOMA could not be used to
trump the PKPA under the facts of those cases, even though both
states had strong state "mini-DOMA" statutes or constitutional
amendments. This section also uses the Miller-Jenkins case to show
how the PKPA, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), 2 1 and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) 22 function together to protect the
jurisdiction of the first court involved in child custody or visitation
litigation.
The first part of Section III considers the situation that existed
before Congress adopted the PKPA and the problem of interstate
kidnapping and relitigation of parental custody and visitation cases. A
review of the problems that led Congress to adopt the PKPA
underscores the chaos that would result from interpreting DOMA to
trump the PKPA. Increasing numbers of children would be thrust into
the nightmare of litigation exemplified in the ongoing Miller-Jenkins
litigation, which has been waged in the courts of two states and which
resulted in the kidnapping of a young child by one of her mothers.
The second part of Section III focuses more broadly on the
problems that would result from permitting states to ignore valid, final
judgments when the first court's jurisdiction is unquestioned. Using
law review commentaries and court opinions, this section establishes
not only that DOMA must not be interpreted to override the
protections of the PKPA, but that DOMA's application to any
judgment should be viewed with suspicion.

21.

UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1968) (amended

1988). Vermont adopted the UCCJA as Title 15, Chapter 19 of the Vermont
Statutes. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1031-1051 (2010).
22.

UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A.

257 (1997 & Supp. 2006). Virginia adopted the UCCJEA as Chapter 7.1 of the
Virginia Code. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-146.1-20-146.38 (2010). For a discussion
of the changes between these two uniform acts, see Kelly Gaines Stoner, The
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)-A
Metamorphosis of the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct (UCCJA), 75 N.D. L.
REV. 301 (1999).
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A.K. v. N.B.

This section discusses two cases dealing with arguments that
"DOMA trumps the PKPA." Trial courts in both Virginia and
Alabama adopted this argument, but the intermediate appellate courts
found it to be unpersuasive, despite the presence of statutes or
constitutional amendments in those states that express a public policy
refusing to recognize same-sex couples' legal relationships.
A. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins cases involving the Vermont and
Virginia Courts
1. A Summary of the Cases
Many who are interested in interstate recognition of same-sex
couples' marriages, civil unions, or domestic partnerships have been
focused on the recent, and still unresolved, custody and visitation case
in Vermont and Virginia. Lisa, the biological mother of a daughter,
filed an action for dissolution of her Vermont civil union on
November 24, 2003.23 Lisa and her partner, Janet, entered into a civil
union in Vermont on December 19, 2000, while they were living in
Virginia. They later decided to have a child together, and Lisa was
impregnated using the sperm of an anonymous sperm donor. Their
daughter was born on April 16, 2002, in Virginia, and the family
moved to Vermont in August 2002.24
Lisa filed for dissolution after living in Vermont until September
2003. She filed the initial papers in Family Court in Rutland County,
Virginia, asking for dissolution of her civil union with Janet, and
noting that their daughter was "the biological or adoptive children of
said civil union." 25 She also asked "that the Court award the plaintiff
legal rights and responsibilities for the minor children" and "physical

23. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 956 (Vt. 2006).
24. Id.
25. Summons, Complaint for Civil Union Dissolution; Notice of Appearance
and Affidavit of Child Custody at 1, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-1103 RWMM (Vt. Fam. Ct. Nov. 24, 2003) (on file with author). The Complaint notes
that, at the time it was filed: (1) Lisa lived in Winchester, Virginia; (2) Janet lived in
Fair Haven, Vermont; and (3) Janet had lived in Vermont continuously since August
5, 2002. Id.
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rights and responsibilities of the minor children," and "that the Court
award the defendant [Janet] suitable parent/child contact
(supervised)." 2 6 Presumably, Janet did not adopt IMJ because she
believed that her parental status based on their civil union was
sufficient protection.2 7
The Vermont trial court issued a Temporary Custody Order on
June 17, 2004, awarding Lisa temporary legal and physical
responsibility for IMJ. 28 Janet was awarded "parent-child contact"
with their child for two weekends in June 2004, in Virginia; one week
in July 2004, in Virginia; and the third full week of every month
starting in August 2004, in Vermont. Janet was also awarded daily
telephone contact. 29
Lisa disagreed with the Vermont court's decision. On July 1,
2004, she filed an action in the Circuit Court in Frederick County,
Virginia, seeking to relitigate Janet's visitation with their daughter.
The Virginia trial court asserted jurisdiction because JMJ had been
living in Virginia for more than six months prior to the filing date.
The court held that Lisa was the "sole biological parent" of IMJ, she
received sole "legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations as
parent" for their daughter, and Janet could not claim parentage of or
visitation with IM\lJ. 30
The Virginia trial court ruled that Virginia's "Marriage
Affirmation Act" (MAA), codified at section 20-45.3 of the Virginia
Code, controlled the case.3 1 That statute, which took effect on the
same day that Lisa filed her suit in Virginia, states:
26. Id. at 2.
27. See Rachal E. Shoaf, Note, Two Mothers and Their Child: A Look at the
Uncertain Status of Nonbiological Lesbian Mothers Under Contemporary Law, 12
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 267, 276 (2005). As Shoaf noted, Janet should not be
punished for not adopting her child "because her rights were equally guaranteed
under the state's civil union laws." Id. Whether Janet would have fared better as an
adoptive parent is unknown, although the few courts that have analyzed the question
of interstate recognition of adoption decrees have upheld the adoptions. See infra
section III.B.2.
28. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 956.
29. Id.
30. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 331 (Va. Ct. App 2006).
31. Order and Certification for Interlocutory Appeal at 2, Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, No. CHO4-280 (Va. Ch. Ct. September 9, 2004) (on file with
author).
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A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between
persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage is prohibited. Any such civil union,
partnership contract or other arrangement entered into by persons of
the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall
be void and unenforceable.3 2
The Virginia trial court concluded: (1) Janet based her claim of
parentage under Vermont law on her civil union with Lisa; and (2) the
civil union was null and void under Virginia law. Consequently, the
court held that Virginia's version of the UCCJEA, codified at section
20-146.1 of the Virginia Code, did not recognize Janet as a "person
acting as a parent" who "claims a right to legal custody under the laws
of this Commonwealth," 33 and neither the UCCJEA nor the PKPA
applied to the case. 34
After the Virginia court's decision, Janet filed a contempt action
in Vermont against Lisa for failing to abide by the Vermont Court's
order. The Vermont trial court held that "Lisa has willfully refused to
comply with this court's order regarding visitation since mid-June,
solely because she does not like it." 35 In Virginia, Janet also filed an
interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order. 3 6
The dispute between the parties focused on whether Virginia had
jurisdiction over Lisa's custody petition, even though Lisa previously
filed for dissolution and custody in Vermont and stated that the
Vermont court should award "parent-child contact" to Janet. Lisa
chose to enter into a civil union with Janet and then moved to
Vermont where the civil union would clearly be recognized. But
when "she received a temporary order she did not like, she not only
refused to comply with it, but she actually initiated a separate action in
a Virginia court, asking that court to disregard the fact that she already
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004).
33. Order and Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 31, at 2; see
also Mark Strasser, When is a Parent not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and
PresumptionsofParenthood,23 CARDOzO L. REV. 299 (2001).
34. Order and Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 31, at 2.
35. Order at 4, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt.
Fam. Ct. Sep. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Order of Contempt] (on file with author).
36. Order and Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 31.
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initiated an action involving the same issues ... in Vermont."3 7
Congress enacted the PKPA to prevent exactly this type of parental
disregard for an unfavorable custody or visitation decision.
2. Application ofPKPA and the UCCJEA to this case
This section applies the PKPA and the UCCJEA to the MillerJenkins case and explains why the Virginia trial court should have
refused jurisdiction over the case under those two statutes. 38
According to Congress, the PKPA was needed because the laws and
practices in different courts are "often inconsistent and conflicting,"
and parties in child custody and visitation disputes often disregard a
negative court order from one state and seek to "obtain[] ...
conflicting orders by the courts of various jurisdictions."3 9 Congress
needed to act because child custody and visitation decrees can be
modified over time if needed to provide for the child's best interest;
consequently, courts did not always treat them as subject to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.40 Thus, ". . . Congress' chief aim in enacting

PKPA was to extend the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit
clause to custody determinations . . . ."41
Through the PKPA, Congress established "national standards" for
determining jurisdiction and for providing "the effect to be given" to
court decisions from other states.42 One purpose of the PKPA was to
"promote cooperation between State Courts," and to "discourage
continuing interstate controversies over child custody in the interest of
greater stability of home environment and of secure family
relationships for the child . ...

37.
38.
Virginia
UCCJA
note 21.

Order of Contempt, supra note 35, at 4-5.
This section does not discuss the UCCJA because it played no part in the
trial court's decision to use DOMA instead of the PKPA, although the
continues to control Vermont's law in child custody disputes. See supra

39. PKPA, supra note 4, § 7(a)(2), (a)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (2006).
40. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180-81 (1988).
41. Id. at 183; see also Bergman v. Zempel, 807 N.E.2d 146, 154 n.8 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004) (PKPA's purpose was to require enforcement of another state's custody
decision as "a federal obligation")
42. PKPA, supra note 4, § 7(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (2006).
43. Id. § 7(c)(1), (c)(4).
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Under the PKPA, "a contestant" is "a[ny] person, including a
parent, who claims a right to custody or visitation of a child."44 Janet
qualifies as a "contestant" because the Vermont laws controlling her
civil union with Lisa presumed her to be the parent of any child born
into their intact civil union. 45 Additionally, a child's "home state" is
"the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the
child lived with [her] parents . .. for at least six consecutive months . .
. ."46 Janet and Lisa moved to Vermont in August 2002 and they lived
there together until Lisa took IMJ back to Virginia with her in
Thus, Vermont was IMJ's "home state" and
September 2003.
Virginia could not have qualified as her "home state" in November
2003, when Lisa filed for dissolution of the civil union, because Lisa
and IMJ had not been living there for six months.
Under the PKPA, Vermont had jurisdiction to issue the initial
custody order if the trial court had jurisdiction under state law (which
the Vermont court had under Vermont's version of the UCCJA and its
civil unions statutes), 47 and the state "had been the child's home State
within six months before the date of the commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of [her]
removal . . . by a contestant, . . . and a contestant continues to live in
Vermont was IMJ's home state until September
such State . . . ."

2003 when Lisa took her to Virginia, and Janet continued to live in
Vermont.
Additionally, "the jurisdiction of a court of a State which has
made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of
this section continues as long" as the requirements specified in the
previous paragraph are met and a contestant continues to live in that
state (Janet continues to live in Vermont). 49 A different court may
modify the original court's decisions only if "the court of the other
State no longer has jurisdiction."5 0 Thus, because Janet remained
44. PKPA, supra note 4, § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(2) (2006).
45. Miller-Jenkins,912 A.2d at 970.
46. PKPA, supra note 4, § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (2006).
47. The Vermont Supreme Court found such jurisdiction under Vermont's
version of UCCJA, codified in part at 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1032(a) (2006).
Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 958.
48. PKPA, supra note 4, § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
49. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (2006).
50. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (2006).
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domiciled in Vermont, Vermont retained jurisdiction; consequently,
Virginia could not modify the Vermont court's determination that
Janet was entitled to visitation with IMJ. Additionally, "[a] court of a
State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody
determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a
court in another State" so long as that other state properly had
jurisdiction. 51 Thus, Virginia could not exercise jurisdiction because
Vermont already asserted jurisdiction in the matter, at Lisa's request,
and the facts of the case satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the
Act.
Under the PKPA, "where home-state jurisdiction is available, it
has priority over any other jurisdictional basis." 52 However, the
Virginia trial court concluded that Virginia's MAA did not recognize
Janet's status as a valid "contestant" under the PKPA because that
status inured from the presumption of parentage arising from her civil
union with Lisa, a union that was null and void in Virginia. But Janet
was not seeking recognition of her civil union or her parental status in
Virginia; she was seeking recognition of the custody order by the
Vermont court in a prior proceeding begun by Lisa.
Analysis under the UCCJEA results in the same conclusion:
Virginia was obliged to accept Vermont's custody order recognizing
Janet as one of IMJ's parents. The UCCJEA "was formulated to
clarify ambiguities and reconcile conflicting interpretations regarding
the circumstances under which a state has jurisdiction to make or
modify custody or visitation orders." 53 The "stated objective" of the
51. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (2006).
52. Kathleen A. Hogan, Custody Jurisdiction,26 FAM. ADVOC. 22, 24 (2004)
(citing 28 USC § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (2006)). In her discussion of full faith and credit
for adoption decrees, Rhonda Wasserman notes that statutes like the Uniform
Adoption Act and the PKPA limit jurisdiction to the home state of the child for the
prior six months in order to ensure that the state has "a significant relationship" with
the parties and issues, "which is the very objective of the most widely followed
choice-of-law approach embodied in the Restatement (Second) on Conflict of
Laws." Wasserman, supra note 13, at 44.
53. Hogan, supra note 52, at 24-25. As of 2010, forty-eight states and the U.S.
Virgin Islands have adopted the UCCJEA, including Virginia. Legislation to adopt
the UCCJEA is pending in both Massachusetts and Vermont, the only states that
have not adopted it. A Few Facts About The... Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
&

Enforcement

Act,

NAT'L

CONF.

OF

COMM'RS
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UNIF.

ST.

http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp
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UCCJEA is to reconcile the UCCJA with the PKPA "by providing
clearer standards for which states can exercise original jurisdiction
over a child custody determination."5 4 Like the PKPA, the UCCJEA
focuses solely on which state courts should have jurisdiction in a wide
range of proceedings.s5 Also like the PKPA, the UCCJEA gives the
"home state" priority in making the initial orders in these proceedings,
and it defines the home state as "the state in which the child has lived
with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive
months immediately before commencement of a custody
proceeding." 56 The only state that qualified as IMJ's "home state"
was Vermont because Lisa and IMJ lived in Virginia for fewer than
six months when Lisa filed for dissolution in Vermont.
Once the home state court asserts jurisdiction, it has continuing
jurisdiction until it decides that it has lost jurisdiction, usually because
no contestant remains in the home state.
Only the decree state can make this determination; a new state of
residence cannot. Thus, relocation of the child and one parent and
the establishment of a new home state does not entitle the new state
to act, nor does it end the exclusive continuingjurisdiction of the
originaldecree state.57

If a party involved in the litigation wants to modify the original decree
in another state, that party "must obtain an order from the original
decree state stating that it no longer has jurisdiction."5 Thus, Vermont
had continuing jurisdiction over the parties' dispute until it decided
visited Jan. 2, 2011).
54. Franki J. Hargrave, Practitioner'sGuide to the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 44 ADvoc. (IDAHO) 8, 8 (June 2001) (citing
Prefatory Note, UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9
U.L.A. 257 (1997 & Supp. 2006)).
55. Hogan, supra note 52, at 25.
56. Id. at 25; see also Irene Casson Gilbert, Does the Court Have Jurisdiction
Over Custody?, 43 ORANGE CNTY. LAW. 54, 55 (2001) (noting that the UCCJEA
gives the home state "absolute priority," while the UCCJA expresses only a
"preference" for the home state, making it compatible with the PKPA, which also
gives the home state "absolute priority").
57. Hogan, supra note 52, at 26 (emphasis added).
58. Hargrave, supra note 54, at 9 (citing UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 203 cmt. at 27, 9 U.L.A. 257 (1997 & Supp. 2006)).
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otherwise, and Virginia could not assert jurisdiction because it
adopted the UCCJEA to govern custody disputes.
It is clear that the policies behind the PKPA and the UCCJEA are
to prevent parents, such as Lisa, from doing exactly what she
attempted to do in this case. She filed a case in Vermont recognizing
her partner's right to parent-child contact with the daughter born
during their civil union. When she did not receive the result she
desired, she took her daughter, moved to Virginia, and sought a new
order, ignoring Vermont's decision in the case.
3. Should DOMA change this result?
Virginia purports to ignore the Vermont court's order pursuant to
DOMA and Virginia's MAA, which declares civil unions to be null
and void in Virginia. But Janet was not seeking recognition of her
civil union in Virginia; she was seeking recognition of the Vermont
court's order, which was issued by IMJ's home state pursuant to its
jurisdiction under both the PKPA and the UCCJEA. The fact that
Virginia considered Janet's civil union (and therefore her claim to be
IMJ's parent) to be "null and void" in Virginia should have been of
little consequence; Virginia's public policy has no bearing on this
case. Rather than focusing on whether Virginia would recognize the
women's Vermont civil union, the Virginia court should have focused
on the national policy, as stated in the PKPA, that parents cannot
simply change courts seeking a different result when they are unhappy
with the decision of a court having proper jurisdiction.
The Vermont court appropriately exercised jurisdiction over the
dissolution and child custody action brought within six months of
when all three family members lived together in Vermont. The error
in this litigation occurred when the Virginia court, not having initial
jurisdiction in the case, attempted to modify the Vermont court's order
granting visitation to the non-biological parent, in violation of both the
PKPA and the UCCJEA. The court mistakenly determined that
Virginia's MAA, which declares rights flowing from civil unions to
be void in Virginia, controlled the case.
But the Virginia Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's
analysis, holding that Virginia lacked jurisdiction over the case. Lisa
argued that the Virginia trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over
the custody dispute under DOMA and the MAA. Rejecting this
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argument, the Court of Appeals stated "Lisa argues that DOMA,
enacted in 1996, effectively trumps the PKPA, enacted in 1980, thus
enabling the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over Lisa's petition.
We disagree."
The Court of Appeals noted that Lisa had cited no authority in
support of her argument that DOMA trumped the PKPA, and rather
than finding a repeal by implication due to an apparent conflict (a
disfavored result), the court concluded it could interpret the two
statutes to reconcile with each other.60 The PKPA's chief aim was to
provide full faith and credit protections to child custody or visitation
decisions; DOMA's chief aim was "to defend the institution of
traditional heterosexual marriage" and "to protect the right of the
States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal
recognition of same-sex unions."61 The Court of Appeals concluded
that "[n]othing in the wording or the legislative history of DOMA
indicates that it was designed to affect the PKPA and related custody
and visitation determinations." 62 The Court confronted Lisa's
argument directly and found that it was misplaced.
This case does not place before us the question whether Virginia
recognizes the civil union entered into by the parties in Vermont.
Rather, the only question before us is whether, considering the
PKPA, Virginia can deny full faith and credit to the orders of the
Vermont court regarding IMJ's custody and visitation. It cannot. 63
The court concluded that "the trial court erred in failing to recognize
that the PKPA prevented its exercise of jurisdiction and required it to
give full faith and credit to the custody and visitation orders of the
Vermont court." 64 The court explicitly refused to consider whether
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 336 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. The court continued: "By filing her complaint in Vermont, Lisa
invoked the jurisdiction of the Vermont court . . .. By operation of the PKPA, her
choice of forum precluded the courts of this Commonwealth from entertaining
countervailing assertions and prayers." Id. The Court also rejected Lisa's argument
that the MAA also forbade extending full faith and credit to the Vermont court's
decision. See id.
64. Id.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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Virginia law "recognizes or endorses" legally recognized same-sex
relationships, whether the MAA was constitutional, and whether the
Vermont court's rulings were correct. Instead, it stated that the issue
before the court "is the narrow one of jurisdiction. By filing her
complaint in Vermont, Lisa invoked the jurisdiction of the courts of
Vermont and subjected herself and the child to that jurisdiction. The
PKPA forbids her prosecution of this action in the courts of this
Commonwealth." 65
This jurisdictional limitation is consistent with the general rules
requiring interstate recognition of judgments. Although courts in
several states may have jurisdiction to decide a case, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause ensures that the first judgment in a case must be
recognized by courts in all other states. 6 6 The Supreme Court does not
require full faith and credit to one state's statutes or "acts" because
another state may have "overlapping legislative jurisdiction;" but once
a court with jurisdiction issues a judgment, that judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit, even though the statute underlying the judgment
is not.67 Thus, "[s]ister-state acts rarely get any faith and credit until
their application is reduced to judgment. And then, the faith and credit
is given to the judgment, not to the act." 68
Unfortunately, the parties' dispute did not end with the Virginia
Court of Appeals' decision, although it was the only time that Lisa's
argument that DOMA trumps the PKPA was considered by the courts.
An appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was dismissed because Lisa
did not file a notice of appeal. 69 But when Janet later tried to register
the Vermont custody order in Virginia, in a second decision, the same
Frederick County Circuit Court judge reversed the juvenile and
domestic relations court and refused to allow it to be registered. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals summarily reversed the circuit court's
order, holding that its initial decision controlled and that the "law of
65. Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the trial court with
instructions "to extend full faith and credit to the custody and visitation orders of the
Vermont court." Id.
66. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice ofLaw, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 249, 321 (1992).
67. Id. at 321-22.
68. Id. at 322.
69. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Va. 2008).
70. Id.
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the case" doctrine did not permit Lisa's appeal.7 ' The Virginia
Supreme Court agreed and dismissed Lisa's appeal.72 Lisa also
appealed the Vermont trial court's order-that Janet was a parent
based on the birth of her daughter while she was living in an intact
civil union with Lisa-to the Vermont Supreme Court, and that court
confirmed Janet's parental status.73
As the introduction makes clear, Lisa continues to ignore the
decisions of the Vermont courts, the Virginia courts, and the United
States Supreme Court. The case is currently on appeal for the third
time to the Vermont Supreme Court, and Janet continues to be
separated from her daughter.
B. A.K. v. N.B. cases involving Californiaand Alabama courts
A case from California and Alabama raises similar arguments
about the relationship between DOMA and the PKPA, on an even
more tenuous factual basis than that in Miller-Jenkins. While the case
does not squarely confront the question of whether DOMA trumps the
PKPA because the women in the case were not married or in any other
legal relationship, it shows how litigants are attempting to use DOMA
to preclude interstate recognition of any parental rights arising from
same-sex relationships. If DOMA's broad reach is extended in this
way, then it has the potential to eliminate PKPA protections for
parents in any same-sex relationship. 74
The Alabama Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' decisions,
finding that the case did not present "a justiciable case over which the
71. Id. The "law of the case" doctrine requires that nothing decided in a first
appeal can be re-examined on a second appeal in the same case, between the same
parties, and on the same facts. Id. at 826.
72. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d at 826, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 726 (2008).
73. See Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 970.
74. Obtaining an adoption decree strengthens the parental rights of the nonbiological parent but, if those rights are based on the partnered status of the parents,
then litigants may still raise DOMA as precluding PKPA protections. For decisions
rejecting the argument that DOMA allows states to ignore adoption decrees by
parents in same-sex relationships, see Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th
Cir. 2007) and Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010) (requiring State officials
in Oklahoma and Louisiana, respectively, to issue new birth certificates following
adoption of a child by same-sex couples in other states). For a discussion of these
cases, see infra Part III.B.2.
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courts in this State may exercise jurisdiction."7 5 Its reasoning
indicated that N.B. initiated litigation in Alabama over which she tried
to litigate A.K's interests but did not serve her or name her as a
defendant. 76 While the Alabama Supreme Court vacated the decisions
at issue, this Article discusses the case and the DOMA/PKPA
argument it raises in an effort to illustrate the extent to which parties
are attempting to expand DOMA's reach to nullify interstate
recognition of parental rights based on any same-sex relationship.
Thus, although the case no longer has precedential value, it remains
useful for a fuller analysis of the issues discussed in this Article.
A.K. and N.B. lived together in a lesbian relationship in
California, where they decided to have a child together via artificial
insemination. N.B. was the birth mother of their child, who was born
in April 1999.77 In 2004, the parties ended their relationship. N.B.
moved with their child to Alabama in August 2005, while A.K.
remained in California. In September 2005, A.K. filed a "Petition to
Establish Parental Relationship" describing herself as a "presumed
mother" under California Family Code section 7611(d) and seeking
custody of and visitation with the child.7 8 When A.K. filed her
petition, N.B. and their child had been living in Alabama for fewer
than six months. The California trial court ordered the parties to
engage in mediation but the record is unclear whether they did. On
August 15, 2006, the parties and their attorneys engaged in a contested
hearing about custody and visitation. 79
In July 2006, the California Supreme Court decided the case of
Elisa B. v. Superior Court,80 holding that "a woman with whom the
biological mother of a child has lived in a committed relationship can,
in law, also be deemed a 'mother' of that child by analogy to
provisions permitting a presumed father of a child to be adjudicated a

75. Ex parte N.B., No. 1080440, 2010 WL 2629064, at *5 (Ala. June 30,
2010).
76. Id.

77. Id. at * 1.
78. A.K. v. N.B., No. 2070086, 2008 WL 2154098, at *1(Ala. Civ. App. May
23, 2008), vacated, sub. nom. Exparte N.B., No. 1080440, 2010 WL 2629064 (Ala.
2010).
79. Id. at *2.
80. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct. of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
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parent of that child." 8 ' Based on that decision, on September 11,
2006, the California trial court held that A.K. and N.B. were both
parents of their child. 82
N.B. filed a "Petition for Temporary Custody" in Alabama on
September 6, 2006, alleging the Alabama court had jurisdiction
because she and the child had lived in Alabama for over a year. 83 On
September 8, 2006, the Alabama court issued an ex parte order
granting N.B. sole custody pending further orders and preventing the
child's removal from Alabama. Despite a complete lack of notice to
A.K., the Alabama court subsequently ruled that California did not
have jurisdiction because N.B. and the child had moved to Alabama
before the California court issued its decision. But the California trial
court continued to assert jurisdiction, ordering that the child's birth
certificate be amended to reflect A.K. as her second parent and that
visitation with A.K. should occur in February and March 2007.84
In April 2007, A.K. appeared in the Alabama court for the first
time, objecting to N.B.'s suit and seeking relief from the judgment.
She contended that, under the PKPA and the UCCJEA, only the
California court could exercise jurisdiction over the visitation dispute
because it entered a proper visitation order first and retained
continuing jurisdiction.85 The Alabama court denied her motion,
holding that the California court's proceedings "were not 'consistent
with' PKPA and it was not required under the UCCJEA to defer to
the California court. 86 A.K. appealed.
The Alabama Court of Appeals determined that California had
appropriately exercised jurisdiction over the dispute under the PKPA
and California's UCCJEA because the child lived in California for the
six months preceding the filing date, and because A.K., a contestant in
the case, continued to reside in California. 87 Thus, the Alabama trial
court "would now be bound, under federal constitutional and statutory

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

A.K., 2008 WL 2154098 at *1; see also Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 673.
A.K., 2008 WL 2154098 at *2.
Id.
Id. at *2-3.
Id.

86.

Id.

87. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1), (c)(2)(A) (2006) and CAL. FAM. CODE

§ 3421(a)(1) (West 2008)).
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law, to give full faith and credit to the judgment of the California court
rendered on September 11, 2006, that A.K. is a parent of the child.""
The PKPA also prevented the Alabama court from re-examining the
California custody decision because "it bars courts in other states from
exercising jurisdiction to make a custody or visitation determination
during the pendency of proceedings in the child's home state." 89
The Court of Appeals recognized the parallel with the MillerJenkins litigation and quoted extensively from the Virginia Court of
Appeals opinion.9 0 Finding itself "confronted with the priority of the
California court's jurisdiction in the case," the Court of Appeals held
the PKPA pre-empted Alabama's assertion of jurisdiction and
required dismissal of N.B.'s case. 9 1 N.B. then sought a Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which was granted. 92
Briefs were filed on April 1, 2009 for N.B. 93 and on May 6, 2009
for A.K. 94 What is perhaps most important, for purposes of this
Article, is whether this case presents a DOMA versus PKPA analysis
at all.9 5 The parties never entered into a domestic partnership while
they were living in California, although limited rights were then
available under a previous California domestic partnership statute. 96
88. Id. at *4.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id.
92. Ex parte N.B., No. 1080440, 2010 WL 2629064, at *1 (Ala. 2010).
93. Petitioner's Brief, Ex parte N.B., 2010 WL 2629064 (Ala. 2010) (No.
1080440) (on file with author).
94. Respondent's Brief, Ex parte N.B., 2010 WL 2629064 (Ala. 2010) (No.
1080440), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/nb-v-ak.html
(follow hyperlink to brief).
95. See Joslin, supra note 20, at 596-598 (arguing that this case does not
involve DOMA because of the lack of a legal relationship between the parties).
Professor Joslin also cites a Social Security ruling in favor of providing benefits to
the child of a non-biological parent in a lesbian relationship, finding that DOMA
was not controlling because "no aspect of the claimant's case is based on a
marriage." Id. at 597-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Assembly Bill No. 25 was signed on October 14, 2001 by California
Governor Gray Davis, and provided certain benefits to domestic partners who
register with the state. See 2001 Cal. Stat. 893. One of the benefits of registering as
domestic partners is that the couple becomes eligible for step-parent adoption, rather
than second-parent adoption, a more onerous process. See Cox, Adoptions, supra
note 14, at 753. California now provides the full range of spousal rights to same-sex
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Thus, it would seem that this case presents a straight-forward
application of the PKPA to protect the initial court's assertion of
jurisdiction over the dispute because there was no marriage between
the parties that might trigger DOMA's influence.
But N.B.'s brief to the Alabama Supreme Court constructs the
"DOMA trumps PKPA" conflict as follows. A.K.'s relationship with
N.B. is the basis for her claim to be a parent to their child since A.K.
did not adopt or bear the child. A.K. argued that she was a "presumed
mother" of the child under section 7611(d) of the California Family
Code and the Elisa B decision.9 7 Finding that both A.K. and N.B. were
parents of the child,9 8 the California trial court ordered that A.K. be
added as a second parent to the child's birth certificate and that A.K.
was entitled to visitation with the child.99
N.B.'s brief to the Alabama Supreme Court asserted that
recognizing the California decision would violate Alabama public
policy as stated in that state's Sanctity of Marriage Amendment
(SMA) and the Marriage Protection Act. The SMA states:
A union replicating marriage of or between persons of the same sex
in the State of Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be
considered and treated in all respects as having no legal force or
effect in this state and shall not be recognized as a marriage or other
union replicating marriage.100

couples, although "marriage" itself was eliminated as a result of Proposition 8. See
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (discussing domestic partnership,
Proposition 8, and marriage rights for same-sex couples).
97. A.K., 2008 WL 2154098, at *1. Under California's version of the Uniform
Parentage Act, codified at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West 2010), "a woman
with whom the biological mother of a child has lived in a committed romantic
relationship can, in law, also be deemed a 'mother' of that child by analogy to
provisions permitting a presumed father of a child to be adjudicated a parent of that
child." A.K., 2008 WL 2154098, at *1.
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id. at *3.
100. ALA. CONST. art. 1 § 36.03(g). Alabama's Marriage Protection Act
(MPA) states: "The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of
parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of
the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued."
ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (2010). Because N.B. and A.K. did not marry in
California, the MPA seems inapplicable. Whether the SMA is applicable is also
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Because A.K. obtained her parental rights in California based on
the parties' relationship, N.B. asserted that DOMA and the SMA
permit Alabama to refuse to recognize the California decision, in spite
of the PKPA's contrary command and in spite of the fact that A.K.
and N.B. did not have a legal relationship as partners.' 0 1 She asserted
that "when Congress passed DOMA in 1996, it made clear that each
State has the sovereign power to determine for itself what effect, if
any, to give orders arising from same-sex relationships."' 02 N.B.
concluded that "sixteen years after the PKPA became law, Congress
enacted DOMA - placing it in the same statutory section at the PKPA
- to clarify a state's right to refuse to give legal effect to child custody
orders arising from same-sex unions treated as marriage." 03
If N.B.'s argument had been accepted, DOMA's impact would
have expanded beyond cases involving interstate recognition of the
marriages (or even legal relationships) of same-sex couples and
instead used to eliminate any right given to individuals whenever
those rights arise from a same-sex relationship. It seems ludicrous
that this could be true. The Alabama Supreme Court did not answer
this question, and in vacating both lower courts' decisions, it
prevented this argument from gaining traction.
III. WHY DOMA MUST NOT BE INTERPRETED TO TRUMP THE PKPA

Federal legislation must not be interpreted to adopt a national
policy that allows courts to ignore the PKPA and use DOMA to
disputed by A.K., but for purposes of this discussion the SMA's applicability is
assumed.
101. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 9-10 (summary of argument).
102. Id. at 30. N.B. tried to expand the reach of DOMA by asserting that
Congress used the term "marriage" because in 1996, alternative institutions, such as
civil unions or domestic partnerships, did not yet exist. Id. at 30 n.7 ("Congress,
therefore, not concerned with the label afforded to the relationship, but the effect of
the relationship, specifically sought to protect a state's right to give full faith and
credit to same-sex unions regardless of the name given by the state."). Nothing in
DOMA's legislative history supports this assertion, and A.K.'s brief specifically
rejects the idea that DOMA applies to this case because the parties do not have a
legal relationship, much less a marriage. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 94, at
51-55.
103. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 93, at 34.
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impose a broad-based exclusion to judgment recognition
jurisprudence that would otherwise recognize those judgments. This
section focuses on why appellate courts keep rejecting the argument
that DOMA extends to situations involving the PKPA or interstate
recognition of other judgments related to same-sex couples'
relationships. These courts have made it clear that the current rule of
judgment recognition has such strong acceptance that it will not be
ignored; this result obtains even in states such as Virginia, Alabama,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana, states that have never been at the forefront
of granting legal rights to same-sex couples. Their refusal to adopt
this argument shows just how unconvincing it is.
The next two subsections look at the policies underlying the
PKPA and the commentary by DOMA supporters to explain why
DOMA should not be interpreted to extend as far as its language may
permit. This analysis concludes the PKPA should be seen as having
continuing validity concerning judgments relating to same-sex
couples' relationships despite DOMA's attempt to displace it.
A. The policies underlyingthe PKPA do not support interpreting
DOM4 to alter our nationalpolicy for resolving custody and
visitation disputes and return to the child-snatching and chaos that
existed before PKPA was enacted
The PKPA, not DOMA, should control in child custody or
visitation disputes between parents in legally recognized same-sex
relationships. The amicus brief of the National Association of
Counsel for Children and related organizations submitted in the
Virginia Supreme Court as part of the Miller-Jenkins litigation is
instructive.1 04 The brief notes that six to ten million children are being
raised in the U.S. by gay or lesbian parents,os making it clear that a
ruling exempting these children from the protections of the PKPA
would have wide-ranging impact.
The Miller-Jenkins parties'
daughter, IMJ, is one of these children; she was one-and-a-half years
old when the litigation began and she celebrated her eighth birthday in
104. Brief for National Association of Counsel for Children et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822
(Va. 2007) (No. 070933), available at 2007 WL 5649428 [hereinafter Amicus
Brief].
105. Id. at 13.
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April 2010. For almost her entire life, she has been uprooted by the
ongoing litigation between her parents.' 0 6 As the brief emphasized,
Lisa's acceptance of the Vermont court's original ruling would have
ended the case within one year; consequently, IMJ and her parents
could have created a routine to help their daughter handle the strain
inherent in shuttling between two parents. 107 Although the briefs
authors could not have known that the controversy would continue to
the present, they made clear why having competing courts and states
relitigating custody and visitation creates havoc in these children's
lives.
This case is the text book [sic] example of the misfortune a child
may suffer if even a single judge disregards the federal and state
laws that create a consistent and efficient system of deciding
custody and visitation matters. It is long since past time for IMJ's
turmoil to end and the [Virginia] Circuit Court's erroneous exercise
ofjurisdiction to be corrected - for the last time.108
The brief emphasized the policy nightmare that existed before
the PKPA was adopted. Citing Thompson v. Thompson, the brief
explained that pre-PKPA law "encourage[d] a parent who does not
have custody to snatch the child from the parent who does and take
the child to another State to relitigate the custody issue in a new
forum," a possibility that remained open at the time because "child
custody orders are subject to modification to conform with changes in
circumstances." 09 In Thompson, the Supreme Court noted that
"[s]tate courts faithfully administer the Full Faith and Credit Clause
every day; now that Congress has extended Full Faith and Credit
requirements to child custody orders, we can think of no reason why
the courts' administration of the federal law in custody disputes will
be any less vigilant."110
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 14.
108. Id. at 15.
109. Id. at 16 (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 181-82 (1988)
(citations omitted)). Thompson held that the PKPA did not provide an implied cause
of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody orders
was valid, and the statute was intended to have the same effect as the Full Faith and
Credit Clause for child custody determinations. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181-82.
110. Id. at 187.
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The brief explained that the PKPA was needed to address
inadequacies of the UCCJA, which was in effect in the late 1970s in a
majority of states. Although intended to increase consistency and
cooperation, the UCCJA exacerbated the problem by creating the
possibility of "parallel proceedings" in different states as long as each
state had a "significant connection to and substantial evidence
regarding the controversy.""' The fact that sister states refused to
enforce existing orders allowed modifications of other states'
judgments and made non-UCCJA states "harbors of refuge to the
parental kidnapper."ll 2
The PKPA was intended to eliminate these problems by awarding
jurisdiction to the child's "home state" as long as one existed." 3
Additionally, Congress adopted the PKPA to "make the enforcement
of a sister state's custody decision a federal obligation" and "to reduce
state-by-state deviations in the interpretation and application of the
UCCJA."11 4 Congress clearly expressed its intention that "[s]tate
courts that exercise jurisdiction consistently with the criteria in the
PKPA are entitled as a matter of Federal law to have their custody and
visitation orders given full faith and credit in sister states."115
In an article that ultimately critiques both the UCCJA and the
PKPA, Professor Anne B. Goldstein recognized the problems
6
presented in cases that embody the "tragedy of the interstate child."ll
With prescient vision, Goldstein recognized that the PKPA only
solves a situation like the one in Miller-Jenkins if the second court,
what she called the "asylum court," defers to the "decree court's"
determination that it had appropriate jurisdiction over the case. 1 7 Ifit
111. Amicus Brief, supra note 104, at 18 (citing Dennis v. Dennis, 366
N.W.2d 474, 479-80 n.9 (N.D. 1986)).
112. Id. at 19 (citing Suzanne Y. LePori, The Conflict Between the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act and the ExtraditionAct: Naming the CustodialParent
Both Legal Guardianand Fugitive, 19 ST. MARY's L.J. 1047, 1055 (1988)).
113. See id. at 18 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (2006)).
114. Id. at 20 (citing Bergman v. Zempel, 807 N.E.2d 146, 154 n.8 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004).
115. Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
116. See Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical
Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental
KidnappingPrevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 845 (1992).
117. Id.at923.
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does not, the "asylum court" will make an independent evaluation of
the decree court's jurisdiction and "may well decide that the decree
court's assessment of its own jurisdiction was erroneous."' 18 This is
exactly what the Virginia trial court concluded when it held that
Virginia's UCCJEA did not recognize Janet as "a person acting as a
parent" with a claim to legal custody under Virginia law, and thus that
the PKPA did not apply to the case.1 19 Although Goldstein anticipated
the problem of whether "asylum courts" would accept a "decree
court's" assertion of continuing jurisdiction, she did not discuss the
idea that an asylum court would use substantive law differences
between the two states to justify ignoring the decree state's judgments.
Instead, Goldstein explained that asylum courts "usually recognize the
decree state's continuing jurisdiction," except when: (1) they
concluded that the initial decree was not consistent with PKPA's
requirements; (2) the decree court's own jurisdictional requirements
were no longer satisfied; or, (3) the decree state was no longer the
residence of the child or any contestant.120 The policies behind the
PKPA underscore its important role in preventing the "tragedy of the
interstate child" from happening to children in same-sex families.
B. DOMA should not be interpretedas alteringthe "iron" rule of
judgment recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that states must give the valid,
final judgments from one state "the same credit, validity, and effect"
that would be given by the state that rendered the judgment. 121
Supreme Court precedent dating back to 1813 has stated that a
judgment from one state is the final resolution of the issues between
the parties in all other states.122 Most commentators agree that
Supreme Court precedent "almost always" requires that valid
judgments of sister-states be given full faith and credit and that the
Court has made clear that "no roving 'public policy exception' to the

118. Id.
119. See sources cited supra notes 21, 38.
120. Goldstein, supra note 116, at 928-29.
121. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1942).
122. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 483-85 (1813); Laycock, supra
note 66, at 299 n.287.
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full faith and credit due judgments" exists. 123 However, through
DOMA, Congress has purported to create a different rule for same-sex
couples alone; a forum state may refuse recognition to judgments
based on rights or claims arising from these couples' legally valid
marriages. 124 This rule is contrary to the one governing virtually
every other judgment.
This section considers arguments by some commentators who
view DOMA as generally constitutional but seem to ultimately reject
its application in the context of PKPA disputes. It also considers
appellate court decisions that have upheld interstate recognition of
judgments from other states. These decisions recognize legal rights of
parents in same-sex relationships, despite mini-DOMA state statutes
or constitutional amendments that express a forum policy hostile to
those rights. Thus both commentators and courts have concluded that
DOMA must be interpreted to have, at most, a limited impact on
interstate recognition of judgments.
1. Commentators
Professor Mark Rosen has written an excellent, thoughtful, and
innovative article discussing whether DOMA is unconstitutional.1 25
However, some of his reasoning as to why DOMA may be
constitutional becomes far less convincing when considered in
context, such as whether child custody and visitation disputes should
be governed by DOMA, instead of the PKPA. Professor Rosen
argued that the command of the Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot
be understood as a provision intended only to unify the states into a
stable nation. 126 Rather, he emphasized that "the Clause aims not only
123. Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Not (Yet?)
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors
That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REv. 915, 945 (2006).
Professor Rosen also contributed to this Symposium and discussions with him have
been extremely helpful.
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
125. Rosen, supra note 123.
126. Id. at 935 ("The animating purpose of the full faith and credit command .
. . 'was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties,
each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings
of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a
remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the
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at unifying the states, but also at ensuring that the states remain
meaningfully empowered, distinct polities."l 27 He chided other
scholars for focusing exclusively on the promotion of unity, and for
failing to recognize the equal importance of ensuring that the union
consists of "meaningfully empowered subfederal polities."128 Rosen
concluded that DOMA is compatible with the principles underlying
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and expressed a preference for state
autonomy over unification. 129
But the PKPA also shows a preference for state autonomy by
giving the child's "home state" exclusive jurisdiction over any other
state that may have a connection to the child, the parents, or the
dispute. The PKPA was designed to protect the initial home state
judgment, and thus, in conflicts like Miller-Jenkins, DOMA interferes
with state autonomy by allowing a state to refuse to recognize this
initial judgment.
Additionally, DOMA ignores the interests of the child's home
state under the PKPA, even though the child's home state has "the
dominant, if not exclusive, interest" in regulating who is entitled to be
recognized in a child custody or visitation dispute. 130
For Congress to take away the enforcement effect of a judgment
from the state which has the primary responsibility to regulate
seems a direct slap in the face to state sovereignty, and it is contrary
to well-settled notions of what the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
supposed to do. 13 1
Equally problematic is that Congress did not elucidate a national
standard for conflicting state policies in DOMA; by contrast, the
PKPA establishes the standard for determining which state should
state of its origin."' (citing Thomas ex rel. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S.
222, 232 (1998) (citations omitted))).
127. Rosen, supra note 123, at 935.
128. Id. (noting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects the "federal
interest in national unity" by ensuring that states do not "unjustifiably infring[e]
upon the legitimate interests of another State" (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 323 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring))).
129. Id. at 938.
130. Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and
Domestic Relations Conflicts Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1063, 1067 (1999).
131. Id.
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have jurisdiction in child custody and visitation disputes. Instead,
under DOMA, "some state policies are frustrated while others are

furthered."' 3 2
Thus, states which should have equal rights to govern affairs within
their legitimate spheres of regulatory authority are divided into two
camps: those whose policy balances are deemed legitimate and
those whose policy decisions are deemed illegitimate . . . . [S]ome

states' judgments become second-class, incapable of extraterritorial enforcement, while other states' judgments have real
validity within the federal system. 133
Professor Rosen then argued that DOMA regulates "a
quintessentially federal function" by regulating the extraterritorial
effects of state laws permitting same-sex couples to marry, as well as
any records or judgments based on such laws.134 Thus, he asserted
that DOMA does not regulate substantive state policies that are
properly based on state law, but instead simply regulates the
extraterritorial effects of those state policies."'
However, DOMA does regulate state policies. As Professor
Stanley Cox explained, "DOMA modifies state policy by relegating to
second-class status state policies approving same-sex marriages."136
Congress should be particularly reluctant to adopt substantive rules in
these areas because of the domestic relations exception to federal
court subject matter jurisdiction for issues concerning divorce,
alimony, and child custody disputes in diversity cases. 137
Professor Rosen further noted that DOMA excludes only those
judgments that share "important characteristics with the small class of
judgments that the Supreme Court does not require states to enforce,
namely, judgments that constitute improper extraterritorial regulation

132. Id. at 1078.
133. Id. at 1078-79.
134. Rosen, supra note 123, at 940.
135. Id.
136. Cox, supra note 130, at 1076-77.
137. Id. at 1077-1078 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 706-07
(1992)); see also Evan Wolfson and Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal
Defects in the 'Defense of Marriage' Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 221, 227-28
(1996).
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by the issuing state."l 3 8 This class of judgments includes those that
regulate property in another state, those based on tax or penal statutes,
those that enforce anti-suit injunctions, or those that improperly
attempt to displace a forum court's determination of whether to admit
evidence.13 9 Rosen concluded that DOMA was adopted to prevent
same-sex couples from getting married in one state, obtaining a
declaratory judgment in that state affirming their marital state, and
thus improperly forcing another state to recognize their marriage when
usual choice of law rules would not require it to do so. 140 The House
Committee report on DOMA stated "it is possible that homosexual
couples could obtain a judicial judgment memorializing their
'marriage,' and then proceed to base their claim of sister-state
recognition on that judicial record." 1 41
Perhaps with regards to declaratory judgments obtained in an
effort to force another state to recognize the marriage of a same-sex
couple when it otherwise would not do so, 14 2 Rosen may have a valid
argument that such a judgment might not receive interstate
recognition.143 But DOMA does not limit its reach to these declaratory
judgments alone; instead, it uses a broad brush to exempt every
judgment that involves "a right or claim arising from" a same-sex
138. Rosen, supra note 123, at 945.
139. Id. at 946-48
140. Id. at 948-49. Professor Rosen considers this to be improper because it
attempts to circumvent the usual rule that "the state of residence has virtually
exclusive regulatory power over family law matters." Id. at 949. Of course,
opposite-sex couples for decades have had their marriages recognized by their home
state despite that type of marriage being prohibited in that state, but entered into in a
different state. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy
Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 61
(1996) (reviewing cases where courts recognized out-of-state marriages of
domiciliary couples despite state statutes prohibiting those marriages within the
state).
141. Rosen, supra note 123, at 948-49 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-664 at 30,
reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 1996 WL 391835).
142. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
143. But see Barbara J. Cox, "Coming Out": The PracticalBattles of Being
Visible as a Lesbian, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 89, 95-96 (discussing the
possibility that same-sex couples may need to seek recognition under each prong of
the Full Faith and Credit clause because their marriages may not be recognized by
other states, even though opposite-sex couples' marriages that were also invalid in
their home states have been recognized).
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couple's marital relationship.144 Unlike any previous congressional
statute enacted under the "Effects Clause," DOMA includes within its
purview countless judgments that would ordinarily be entitled to
recognition under the "Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit." 45 Rosen
himself agrees DOMA should apply only to "nonadversarial
declaratory judgments" because to do otherwise would "run afoul" of
the requirement that laws enacted by Congress under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause must "reflect a 'reasonable' harmonization of the
principles of unification and state sovereignty."146 Thus, Rosen did not
craft a rule that would permit DOMA to trump PKPA concerning the
types of judgments at issue in PKPA litigation.
Even after conceding that DOMA's reach may not appropriately
extend beyond declaratory judgments, Rosen maintains that even if
DOMA states a public policy exception to the usual rule of judgment
recognition, DOMA can validly do so because it was adopted by
Congress to announce "a tightly confined exception, restricted to
judgments in connection with same-sex marriage."' 47 He viewed such
a tightly confined exception as "less threatening to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause's goal of creating a union than a 'ubiquitous'
exception." 48
It is difficult to conceive how DOMA's language excluding "any.
judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship
between persons of the same-sex that is treated as a marriage... or a

144. DOMA, supra note 7, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
145. See generally William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and
Credit, 53 MD. L. REv. 412 (1994); Stewart E. Sterk, The Muddy Boundaries
Between Res Judicataand Full Faith and Credit, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 47, 98
(2001).
146. Rosen, supra note 123, at 980-81. Rosen acknowledges this problem and
says that DOMA should be construed narrowly to avoid applying to judgments that
are otherwise subject to recognition. Id. at 977-81. Thus, DOMA should not apply
to situations involving the PKPA where Congress has made clear that its
jurisdictional principles are intended to prevent the problems clearly presented by
the Miller-Jenkins litigation. See Mark D. Rosen, Congress's Primary Role in
Determining What Full Faith and Credit Requires: An Additional Argument, supra
pp. 28-33 (conceding that only declaratory judgments concerning same-sex couples'
marriages should be controlled by DOMA).
147. Rosen, supra note 123, at 950-51.
148. Id. at 951.
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right or claim arising from such relationship"1 4 9 can be seen as tightly
confined. If Congress were concerned about the possibility of samesex couples using a declaratory judgment to force recognition of their
marriage in another state, then Congress should have stated a narrow
exception through DOMA. 50 But to declare that states do not have to
recognize "any judicial proceeding" concerning the hundreds of state
rights based on marital or (perhaps) other legal relationships cannot be
seen as "tightly confined" in any way."'
Thus, the distinction between the PKPA and DOMA becomes
clear. It is difficult to understand why the Virginia and Alabama trial
courts were willing to displace the PKPA, a proper jurisdictional
statute enacted under the "Effects Clause" of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, with DOMA, a statute that runs counter to settled Supreme
Court jurisprudence and prior congressional action. Congress limited
the PKPA to determining the appropriate jurisdiction(s) for deciding
custody and visitation cases, based on their connection to the parties
and the litigation. In contrast, DOMA seems to declare: "A same-sex
union is always suspect, regardless of how strong the connecting
factors were to the rendering jurisdiction."l 5 2 With the PKPA,
Congress ". . . required enforcement of judgments, regardless of the
enforcement state's distaste as to the substantive context of the

149. DOMA, supra note 7, § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
150. This Article does not address the question whether such an exception
might run afoul of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003). See generally Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionalityof the
Defense of MarriageAct in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 263
(1997) (arguing that under Romer, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
renders DOMA unconstitutional); Mark P. Strasser, "Defending" Marriage in Light
of the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer-Lawrence Jurisprudence: Why DOMA Cannot
Pass Muster after Lawrence, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 421 (2004-05) (arguing that
DOMA cannot be constitutional unless the Supreme Court overrules this line of
cases).
151. This is not to mention the 1,138 federal rights that would be available to
married same-sex couples if their marriages received federal recognition, a result
prevented by section 3 of DOMA. See Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, to Sen. Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf; see
also DOMA, supra note 7, § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. §7 (2006) (limiting recognition to those
marriages that are between "one man and one woman").
152. Cox, supra note 130, at 1081.
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custody determination . . . ."53 In contrast, DOMA allows nonenforcement of judgments based solely on the enforcement state's
distaste with same-sex unions.
DOMA's overreaching with respect to judgments has been
criticized from the outset, even by those who otherwise consider it to
be constitutional with respect to allowing states to choose for
themselves whether to recognize marriages of same-sex couples from
other states and defining "marriage" and "spouse" for federal purposes
to exclude same-sex couples. As detailed in my 2003 article on full
faith and credit and interstate recognition of adoptions by same-sex
couples, respected commentators, including Patrick Borchers, Jeffrey
Rensberger, and Ralph Whitten, have all concluded that DOMA's
inclusion of all judgments arising from a same-sex couple's marriage
cannot be justified.' 5 4 All three commentators agree that "Congress
may have mis-stepped" 55 and that "we may hope that the application
of DOMA to judgments will be limited to the 'declaration of
marriage' scenario and not extended to more traditional
judgments."1 56 Fortunately, no appellate courts have been willing to
extend DOMA's reach to judgments enacted in other states and the
courts have continued to insist on judgment enforcement without a
public policy exception for same-sex couples.
Two additional policies that support the Supreme Court's "iron"
rule of judgment enforcement also support the interpretation that
DOMA does not trump the PKPA: finality and nationwide
enforcement. Of particular importance in a case like Miller-Jenkins
where IMJ has been subject to litigation since she was one-and-a-half
years old, the Supreme Court has been clear that there is a "national
153. Id.
154. Cox, Adoptions, supra note 14, at 772-76 (citing articles by Borchers,
Rensberger, and Whitten).
155. Id. at 774 (citing Jeffrey Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the
Defense of MarriageAct: A Deviant View of an Experiment in Full Faith and
Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 409, 455 (1998)).

156. Id. at 775 (citing Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of MarriageAct, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 255, 391 (1998)); see also Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing
Domestic Partnerships:Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU
L. REV. 1235, 1248-49 (2001) (arguing that DOMA should be confined to "bogus"
declaratory judgments attempting to require interstate recognition of marriages by
same-sex couples).
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interest in finality of judgments: litigation must end somewhere." 15 7
As the Supreme Court recognized:
The [Full Faith and Credit Clause] compels that controversies be
stilled so that where a state court has jurisdiction of the parties and
subject matter, its judgment controls in other states to the same
extent as it does in the state where rendered.15 8
Enforcement of sister states' judgments also ensures that each
state's judgments enjoy national recognition. By relinquishing the
power to decide cases where other courts have already rendered
judgments, each state ensures that its own judgments will also be
recognized in all other states.' 59 Nowhere is finality and national
recognition more important than in cases involving litigation over
parental rights, custody, and visitation. The PKPA was adopted to end
relitigation by unhappy parents because national policy needed to
prevent the ongoing disruption to parents and children when finality
was not accorded to these judgments. DOMA should not be
interpreted to trump the PKPA and reopen that nightmare for samesex parents and their children.
2. Trial courts have been susceptible to the argument that DOMA4
applies to judgment recognition but appellate courts have rejected this
interpretation
The trial courts of Virginia and Alabama were susceptible to
arguments that DOMA changes the Supreme Court's "iron-clad rule"
of judgment recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
However, appellate courts in states with strong public policy
statements against recognizing rights for same-sex couples based on
their legal relationships have nonetheless rejected the argument that
DOMA allows them to refuse to recognize judgments from other
states awarding rights to individuals in same-sex relationships. In
addition to the Virginia and Alabama Court of Appeals' decisions
discussed above, the recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in
157.
Williams
158.
159.

Cox, Adoptions, supra note 14, at 777 (citations omitted); see also
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942).
Riley v. N.Y. Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348 (1942).
See Cox, Adoptions, supra note 14, at 777-78.
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Adar v. Smith,16 0 although concerning interstate recognition of an
adoption decree, is instructive. That decision rejected the argument
that non-recognition of judgments is permissible under our federal
system of government that requires one state to subjugate its local
public policy in order to support national unity with regards to valid,
final judgments issued in another state. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision is also consistent with that of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Finstuen v. Crutcher.161 The Finstuen court is the
only other federal appellate court to consider this argument in the
context of interstate recognition of an adoption decree.
In Adar, two gay men adopted a son who was born in Louisiana
for whom they received a joint adoption decree from a New York state
court.162 The parents then applied to the Registrar of Louisiana's
Office of Vital Records and Statistics seeking a new birth certificate
listing the two men as the parents of their son. 163 The Registrar
refused to issue the new birth certificate, relying on an opinion from
the Louisiana Attorney General that the state did not owe full faith and
credit to the adoption judgment "because [the judgment] is repugnant
to Louisiana's public policy of not allowing joint adoptions by
unmarried persons."l 64
The adoptive parents filed an action in federal court. Granting
summary judgment in their favor, the district court held "Louisiana
owes full faith and credit to the New York adoption decree and that
there is no public policy exception to the Clause."' 65 The Registrar
then appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed.
The Court of Appeals began its opinion by citing the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision of Finstuen v. Crutcher,where three
160. 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010), reh'g en banc granted,622 F.3d 426 (5th
Cir. 2010).
161. 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
162. Adar, 597 F.3d at 701.
163. Id.
164. Id. For a discussion of why adoption decrees should not be impacted by
DOMA because they do not arise under marriage, civil unions, or domestic
partnerships, but instead are available to same-sex partners who do not marry, see
Deborah L. Forman, InterstateRecognition of Same-Sex Parentsin the Wake of Gay
Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships,46 B.C. L. REV. 1, 79 (20042005).
165. Adar, 597 F.3d at 702.
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same-sex couples challenged an amendment to Oklahoma's foreign
adoption statute prohibiting Oklahoma from recognizing adoptions by
same-sex couples. 166 There, the district court held the statute
unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Court
of Appeals agreed.167 The appellate court "reasoned that each State
owes full faith and credit to every other state's judgments . .. . [T]he
amended adoption statute's categorical refusal to recognize out-ofstate judgments was unconstitutional."1 68 The state was required to
issue a new birth certificate because to do otherwise "would be a
violation of the 'evenhanded' requirement in applying local
The U.S.
enforcement mechanisms to foreign judgments." 69
Baker
v.
General
Motors
imposed
this
requirement
in
Supreme Court
and required that even-handedness be applied in each state so that all
judgments from other states are enforced in the same fashion. 170
In its discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Adar
court insisted that an out-of-state judgment must be given the same
effect in other states as it receives in the issuing state, noting that
"[s]uch expansive full faith and credit was later held not to be owed to
a statute enacted in another state, however, when the forum state is
competent to legislate on the matter." 7 1 It then discussed the
''exacting" requirement that full faith and credit be accorded to
judgments from sister-states and rejected the notion that "roving
public policy exceptions" should permit a state to "refuse to recognize
an out-of-state judgment on the grounds that the judgment would not

166. Id. at 703 n.7 (citing Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir.
2007)); see also Lisa S. Chen, Second ParentAdoptions: Are They Entitled to Full
Faith and Credit?, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 171 (2005) (arguing Oklahoma statute
is unconstitutional); Robert G. Specter, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma's
Statute Denying Recognition to Adoptions by Same-Sex Couplesfrom Other States,
40 TULSA L. REv. 467 (2005) (same).
167. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1156.
168. Adar, 597 F.3d at 703 n.7 (citing Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1154-56).
169. Id.
170. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.
171. Adar, 597 F.3d at 707 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538
U.S. 488, 494 (2003)); Baker, 522 U.S. at 232; Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S.
717, 722 (1988); Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,
501 (1939); see also Wasserman, supra note 13, at 21-22 (discussing full faith and
credit owed to statutes).
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obtain in the forum state." 172 The court concluded, "there is virtually
universal acknowledgement that Louisiana owes full faith and credit
to the New York adoption decree and must recognize that the
Adoptive Parents are Infant J's legal parents." 173
After rejecting several other arguments raised by the Registrar, the
Adar court found that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is a
"mandatory, constitutional curb on every state's sovereign power,
[providing] a state ... no discretion to disregard a decision of another
state on a matter over which that other state is competent to exercise
jurisdiction."1 74 The court continued:
Under [the Registrar's] reasoning, to the extent a judgment
incorporates the statutory-and repugnant-public policy of the
adjudicating state, a forum state would be free to ignore the
adjudicating state's judgment as an improper substitution for the
forum state's statute. Such a reading, for the purpose of
interstitially importing such an illicit "public policy exception" to
the reach of the Clause, is utterly contradicted by precedential full
faith and credit jurisprudence. 175
As demonstrated in Finstuen and Adar, as well as in the Court of

Appeals decisions from Virginia in Miller-Jenkins and from Alabama
in A.K. v. N.B., appellate courts see no basis for displacing full faith
and credit precedent merely to deny judgment recognition to same-sex
couples asserting parental rights.

172. Adar, 597 F.3d at 707-08 (citing Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 and Milwaukee
Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)).
173. Id. at 708 n.34 (citing Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1156 (where that court
collected authorities from nine jurisdictions concluding that adoption decrees were
owed full faith and credit)); see also Alexander v. Gray, 181 So. 639, 645 (La. Ct.
App. 1938) (holding that Louisiana affords full faith and credit to out-of-state
adoption judgments).
174. Id. at 710 (citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438
(1943) ("We are aware of no . . . considerations of local policy or law which could

rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which the full faith and credit clause
and the Act of Congress require to be given to . . . a judgment outside the state of its
rendition.")).
175. Id. at 710.
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IV. CONCLUSION

This Article began by noting that Lisa Miller refuses to relinquish
custody of her daughter to Janet Jenkins, her ex-partner and a legallyrecognized parent of their daughter, more than seven years after the
parties' custody dispute first gained national attention. Much of her
resistance seems to stem from the positive legal action she obtained in
Virginia, where a trial court twice vindicated her attempt to ignore the
legal judgments from Vermont requiring Lisa to share parenting with
Janet. But for those court orders, Lisa may well have realized she had
to face what every divorcing couple faces: somehow the two parents
who were partners need to develop the ability to interact with their ex
to help their children transition from an intact family to two separate
families.
These challenges are difficult enough when they do not involve
constitutional theory, opposing state policies, interstate recognition of
judgments, and two federal statutes. But when they do, parents and
their children are not helped by being convinced that their problems
require extraordinary answers. Lisa and Janet needed to work out
their differences to help their daughter cope with losing her intact
family.
Congress has caused much of the parties' problems by adopting
two statutes that seemingly conflict. While one requires state courts to
recognize a judgment from a sister state when that state had
jurisdiction to resolve custody or visitation disputes between parents,
the other appears to allow a state to ignore that judgment despite two
hundred years of judicial precedent in an attempt to minimize the
spread of legal relationships between same-sex couples. This Article
has used two cases between lesbian ex-partners and their children to
highlight the impossible situations that result when one state ignores
settled constitutional law requiring interstate recognition of valid
judgments. Both policy and precedent support interpreting DOMA in
such a way so as not to disrupt the solution established by the PKPA.
The mistake that Congress made-sweeping too broadly in
DOMA's overreaction to the possibility of marriage between samesex couples-should not negate settled policy under the PKPA, which
helps couples solve custody and visitation disputes when their
relationships end. Still, this Article's discussion as to why DOMA
cannot be allowed to trump the PKPA should not be confined to these
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cases alone, but instead should be used to recognize the inherent
problems that DOMA raises as national policy. The recent decision
by the Massachusetts District Court that DOMA is unconstitutional as
far as preventing married same-sex couples in Massachusetts from
obtaining federal benefits available to all other married couples in the
U.S. underscores the reasons why DOMA must be repealed.' 7 6 Until it
is repealed, our appellate courts must continue to refuse to implement
its policies. As the cases cited in this Article show, appellate courts
recognize the disruption DOMA would bring to settled constitutional
doctrine, and they reject its ability to dismantle the important and
settled law created by the PKPA.
We can only hope that Lisa Miller will soon resolve her dispute
with Janet Jenkins, and allow their daughter to receive love and
support from each of her parents. And we can only hope that our
appellate courts will continue to serve the important roles they serve
in limiting DOMA's reach until it is repealed or declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

176. Memorandum Opinion, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs., No. 1:09-111 56-JLT (July 8, 2010).

